

## **CONDOR LIBERATION BERTHING INCIDENT SUMMARY REPORT**

### **Introduction**

On Saturday 28 March 2015, Condor Liberation suffered minor damage to the port amah, having landed hard against No. 1 berth in St Peter Port, Guernsey. There were no injuries. This report summarises the investigation carried out by Condor Ferries. The investigation was conducted jointly as a company internal investigation and for the external report required by the Guernsey Harbour Master.

### **Background**

The incident and resultant damage were of such low severity that third party investigation (other than that conducted by Guernsey Harbours) was not required.

The investigation was carried out by Condor's Marine Manager, and verified by the Executive Director -Operations and the Safety Director (DPA). The full internal investigation report has been reviewed by the Board of Directors of Condor Ferries Ltd and the Guernsey Harbour Master, and this report is verified as an accurate summary of its findings.

In conducting the investigation, all applicable material and evidence was obtained and reviewed including (but not limited to) Voyage Data Downloads, ECDIS records, maintenance and technical logs, CCTV, crew training logs, vessel familiarisation programme, records of prevailing conditions and witness statements.

### **Description Of Incident**

Condor Liberation sailed from Poole on 28<sup>th</sup> March, bound for St Peter Port and St Helier. The bridge team consisted of a Senior Master, Additional Master, two Chief Officers and a Chief Engineer.

At 1252, following completion of the ship's arrival checklist, the vessel was positioned for berthing onto Guernsey Harbour Berth 2. The Additional Master engaged 'auto' mode within the manoeuvring system and turned the vessel to port about the turning dolphin. Once parallel to the berth, he gained sternway, and as the ship set away from the berth, he demanded maximum sideways thrust. The vessel maintained heading but continued to set down against the wind, and, at 1255 the attempt was aborted and the vessel positioned in safe water between the Pier Heads.

The Bridge Team reviewed the manoeuvre in light of prevailing conditions and agreed that to berth on No2 berth would, under the circumstances, be an alternative option. Permission was gained from St Peter Port control, and manoeuvring control was transferred to the port bridge wing in 'auto' mode by the Senior Master.

The Senior Master's planned manoeuvre was to back round the turning dolphin at the southern end of No 1 linkspan gaining as much distance upwind as possible.

As the ship came astern, the wind increased to 28 Kts (gusting 32knts), and the maximum starboard turn was demanded. The vessel began to set heavily towards the berth once the bow had cleared the dolphin. The Master, took evasive action to land the vessel parallel on the berth and across multiple fenders. This was very nearly achieved but the ship landed heavily on a cylindrical single steel vertical piling.

The point load nature of the impact caused damage to the protective belting on the ship (which is designed to protect the hull of the ship in case of impact), but also caused deformity to some internal frames and minor hull penetration in to a void space. The damage was above the water line.

The vessel subsequently completed the berthing manoeuvre without further issues. Inspection of the damage after arrival resulted in the cancellation of the subsequent legs of the planned voyage, discharging all passengers and being withdrawn from service for repairs. There were no injuries and the vessel remained in a safe condition at all times.

# Conclusions

## **The investigation concluded the following:**

When the incident occurred, Condor Liberation and her crew were suitably trained and experienced and had been fully assessed by all relevant authorities in order to enter service.

Condor Liberation was fully manned as per the Permit to Operate and the Bridge Team was highly experienced, consisting of a Senior Master (with Condor Liberation since her acquisition), an Additional Master (undergoing vessel specific familiarisation but with many years of experience on High Speed Craft) plus two Chief Officers, and a long serving Chief Engineer, all of whom had been with the ship since her acquisition.

Appropriate assessment of the expected conditions was made by Masters and Operations team before confirming that the voyage should proceed.

Analysis of voyage data showed positive bridge team procedures and clarity of intended actions throughout.

Due to benign conditions during trials, all pre-service port trials conducted in Guernsey and Jersey had only been conducted in moderate conditions.

Different use of the settings (i.e. using 'manual' rather than 'auto') within the enhanced manoeuvring system may have been more effective in completing the berthing manoeuvre.

An enhanced manoeuvring system had been installed to upgrade the original system and to permit manoeuvring of the vessel from the bridge wings in the confined ports in the Channel Islands. This could be operated in either 'auto' mode or 'manual' mode.

The Master's decision to utilise 'auto' mode was reasonable given his previous experiences with the ship but with the additional information gained during the investigation, it is concluded that 'manual' mode is more suitable for some operating conditions.

The decision to attempt to berth on No 1 was reasonable as there was no evidence to suggest that a further attempt to berth on No 2 would have been successful.

## Actions

1. Repairs completed and approved to the requirements of ship's classification body DNV-GL
2. Internal investigation carried out and all required external reporting requirements observed
3. Meetings held with manufacturers to determine causal factors and examine options
4. Interim limits (25Kts) for berthing in St Peter Port agreed with Guernsey Harbour Master. Post initial investigations, Guernsey Harbour Master and Condor agreed incremental adjustments to these limits. (This limit has now been removed and the vessel is operating to its design capability).
5. Systematic sharing of information between Masters on Liberation with respect to manoeuvring in different conditions
6. Manoeuvring system reconfigured to provide an increase in available power and jet angle during berthing

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